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Abstract
Some proponents of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of con-
sciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is 
possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of 
empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed 
empirical evidence; Change blindness (CB). CB occurs when a subject 
fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alterna-
tive interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation 
does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be 
pursued to defend the claim that CB is evidence of misrepresentation 
against my interpretation. I conclude that none of the lines of reply 
succeed in preserving CB as evidence of misrepresentation. The upshot 
is that, pending further evidence, CB cannot be deployed as empirical 
evidence in the debate on misrepresentation.
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1 Introduction
Higher-order theories of consciousness assume that mental states can 
be unconscious or conscious. The underlying distinction is that a 
mental state that one is not aware of being in is not — on any rea-
sonable account — a conscious state. This idea has become known 
as the Transitivity Principle (TP): A conscious state is a state one is aware of 
oneself as being in.
Higher-order theories propose that being conscious of some-
thing may be explained in terms of a relation between two mental 
states. The higher-order thought theory of consciousness suggests 
a relation obtaining between the conscious state and a thought-like 
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higher-order representation (HOT) of it, is what generates conscious 
experience of being in a mental state. Thus, the way that one be-
comes conscious of being in a given mental state is by having a suit-
able HOT about that state. The HOT makes you conscious of being 
in a mental state x because it represents the thinker of the thought 
as being in x.
On David Rosenthal’s version of HOT theory, that will be the 
topic below, we become aware of ourselves as being in a given con-
scious state by having a suitable higher-order thought about that state 
of the form ‘I am in state x’. There are several riders, as to what 
qualifies as a suitable HOT. The riders include, for example, provi-
sions that the HOT is not itself a conscious state, the HOT must 
not come about as a result of conscious inference or observation, 
and that the HOT must be simultaneous with the mental state it 
represents (see e.g. Rosenthal 1997, 2002a, 2002b for the details of 
HOT theory). In addition, Rosenthal (e.g. 2004b) thinks that the 
presence of a suitably caused HOT is sufficient for consciousness, 
even if the target state of the HOT does not exist. An individual will 
undergo a conscious experience of red provided that she believes that 
she is undergoing an experience of red. This is known as the possibil-
ity of misrepresentation and has received much attention in the past 
decade.
Misrepresentation occurs if there are discrepancies between a 
HOT and the mental state it is about. When there is a discrepancy, 
an individual will have a conscious experience of the state the HOT 
describes her as being in — regardless if she has it or not. Thus, if a 
HOT describes an individual as seeing something blue, the individu-
al will experience seeing blue regardless of which lower-order states 
obtain1. According to Rosenthal, the mental state the individual is 
conscious of being in, in this case, is merely a “notional state” (e.g. 
Rosenthal 2000b: 232). A notional state is merely a de dicto state, it 
has no neural correlates; it suffers from intentional inexistence.
It has been argued that if discrepancies between a HOT and the 
state that it is about are possible, this poses serious problems for the 
1 Observe that some versions of the HOT theory reject the possibility of mis-
representation, e.g. the dispositionalist HOT theory of Peter Carruthers (1998) 
and the wide intrinsicality view of Rocco Gennaro (1996, 2012).
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HOT theory. The two problems that have been discussed most ex-
tensively are whether the HOT theory violates intuitive theoretical 
principles associated with first, phenomenal qualities, and second, 
existence criteria of mental states. In the first case the underlying 
idea is that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic to first-order states 
and do not depend on HOTs (e.g. Balog 2000, Block 2011a, 2011b, 
Matey 2011, Neander 1998, Rosenthal 2004b, 2011, 2012, Shepherd 
2013, Weisberg 2008, 2010, 2011). In the second case, the objection 
is that if a mental state is conscious this seems to entail that it ex-
ists, therefore explaining misrepresentation in terms of a “notional 
state” cannot be done (e.g. Berger 2014, Block 2011a, 2011b, Matey 
2006, Rosenthal 2011, 2012, Weisberg 2010, Wilberg 2010).  Con-
sequently, according to the critics, misrepresentation along the lines 
described above, would be impossible.
While the HOT theory seems counterintuitive to some, it is not 
incoherent: It can account for its explanandum within the frame-
work it has set forth for itself. Many defendants of the HOT theory 
consider themselves to have provided successful replies to the the-
oretical objections against the theory (e.g. Rosenthal 2011, 2012). 
Of course, the opponents do not agree. There is no obvious win-
ner of the debate, which seems to have reached a stalemate. Now, 
if it is correct that the HOT theory in general, and the stance that 
misrepresentation is possible in particular, both are coherent, and, 
furthermore, that there is limited interest in pursuing the theoreti-
cal debate, there seems to be little hope to resolve the issue of mis-
representation by theoretical argumentation. However, there is, in 
addition to theoretical argument, the option of invoking empirical 
data in the debate on misrepresentation. One might object that em-
pirical data cannot have any bearing on conceptual issues. While this 
objection is legitimate, the aim is not to let the empirical data decide 
the conceptual issue. Rather, the inclusion of empirical data in the 
debate is a way of showing that the HOT theory has empirical force. 
Furthermore, it is part of a larger inference to the best explanation 
(IBE) argument in support of the HOT theory against other theories 
of consciousness. The IBE argument subsumes the misrepresenta-
tion debate. In the context of the IBE argument, defendants of the 
HOT theory have put forth different suggestions of how empirical 
data can support both the theory in general and specifically, claims 
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for the possibility of misrepresentation (Lau 2007, Lau and Brown to 
appear; Lau and Rosenthal 2011a, 2011b, Rosenthal 2012).2 To evalu-
ate these suggestions amounts to assess the data and their bearing on 
the issues they concern. So far, not much work has been carried out 
in this regard. Two recent exceptions include Kirkeby-Hinrup 2014 
and Sebastián 2014. This article is a further effort in this direction.
One piece of empirical data that has been suggested to support 
the possibility of misrepresentation is the phenomenon of change 
blindness (CB). In CB paradigms, limitations in the visual system are 
exploited to make the subject fail to detect changes between pre-
sented visual stimuli that are similar to each other but not identical. 
E.g., when two images are presented in close temporal proximity 
experimental manipulations can prevent the subject from detecting 
salient differences between them. On the interpretation offered by 
the defendants of the possibility of misrepresentation, the failure to 
detect changes across scenes can be explained by the subject misrep-
resenting her visual states. The idea is that when an individual fails 
to detect the changes in his visual stimuli, when there is good reason 
to think the corresponding first-order states have changed. Thus, 
what she is consciously experiencing exhibit discrepancies with the 
states she is actually in. The aim here is to investigate this particu-
lar interpretation of CB. The upshot of the present investigation is 
the observation that, because correct representation is distinguished 
from misrepresentation by how the HOT relates to the mental state 
that it concerns, misrepresentation cannot be separated from correct 
representation unless the representational structure is known. How-
ever, because at present there is no way of knowing which represen-
tational structures obtain in the experiments, viz. because there is 
no way of establishing how the HOT relates to the mental state it is 
about, the empirical data from CB can have very little bearing on the 
misrepresentation debate.
In the next section, I will discuss the basic tenets of the HOT 
theory and the kind of misrepresentation that is the subject of the 
debate. In section 3, I will present the phenomenon of change 
blindness and explain in detail why it is inadequate as evidence of 
2 Empirical data as well have been used to argue that the HOT theory is 
wrong (cf. Kozuch 2014).
41Change Blindness and Misrepresentation
misrepresentation. In section 4, I will consider three lines of reply 
that may be pursued in the attempt to make CB relevant to misrep-
resentation. I conclude that none of the three replies are successful 
and that CB is not evidence for misrepresentation.
2 HOT theory and misrepresentation
The issue of misrepresentation has been exhaustively explicated by 
Karen Neander (1998). Neander suggests a scenario in which three 
individuals (later dubbed ‘Neander’s Triplets’ by Ned Block in his 
2011) have identical HOTs but differ in the lower-order states of 
those HOTs. All three have a HOT describing themselves as see-
ing something red. However, only the first individual has a target 
first-order state corresponding to seeing something red. The second 
individual has a target first-order state of seeing something blue, and 
the third individual has no target first-order state at all. In Neander’s 
terms the HOT of the second individual is mildly misrepresenting 
the first-order state, when it describes the individual as seeing some-
thing red rather than blue. In the third individual the HOT is a radical 
misrepresentation because there is no relevant first-order state at all. 
What Neander intends to show with the scenario is that according 
to the higher-order accounts of consciousness, the three individu-
als have identical conscious experiences. Seen from the first-person 
perspective it does not matter whether the relevant first-order state 
is there, is mildly misrepresented, or is not there at all. The three 
possibilities are subjectively indistinguishable.
The supposed theoretical implications of the possibility of mis-
representation, have incurred an extensive and lengthy debate. As 
mentioned above, the defendants of the HOT theory have begun sup-
porting their argument with empirical data (Lau and Brown to ap-
pear, Lau and Rosenthal 2011a, Rosenthal 2012). One such piece of 
empirical data is change blindness.
3 Change blindness
The most well-known examples of CB are the so-called flicker para-
digms pioneered by Rensink, O’Regan and Clark (Rensink, O’Regan 
and Clark 1997). In addition to these there is a wide variety of other 
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approaches in the field (see e.g. Beck, Rees, Frith and Lavie 2001, 
Busch 2010, Busch, Fründ and Herrmann 2010, Simons and Am-
binder 2005, Simons and Rensink 2005), but I will limit myself to 
the flicker paradigms in the following.
In the flicker paradigm the subject is presented with two pictures 
separated temporally by a distractor screen. The two pictures dif-
fer in some respect, and the task of the subject is to detect what is 
changing. The change may concern a quite salient element of the two 
pictures and still have a strong experimental effect, e.g., a change 
of color, or the complete disappearance of a prominently featured 
object. It is hypothesized that the cause of the CB effect in the flicker 
paradigms is the distractor screen disrupting the pre-change repre-
sentation. The distractor screen supposedly disrupts the visual trace 
of the pre-change picture in a way that precludes comparison to the 
post-change picture. Call this the no comparison (NC) interpreta-
tion of CB effect.3 Now, it seems that because of the disruption, the 
flicker paradigms are ill-suited as evidence for misrepresentation. 
The reason they are ill-suited is that if the disruption between the 
pre-change and post-change representations fully explains the ef-
fect, then the flicker paradigms do not license any conclusions about 
misrepresentation. The reason why they do not license such conclu-
sions is that according to the NC interpretation, the subject correctly 
represents the post-change first-order visual state, but is unable to 
compare it to his previous (pre-change) visual state. Plainly, on the 
NC interpretation there are no discrepancies between first-order 
states and HOTs, hence, no misrepresentation. Remember that mis-
representation occurs if there is a discrepancy between the HOT and 
the mental state it is about. Because, on the flicker paradigm the as-
sumption is that visual representations are correct and the failure of 
the subjects is taken to consist in a failure to compare the stimuli, the 
change blindness paradigm that the defendants of the HOT theory 
prefer to cite in support of the possibility of misrepresentation is 
saccade-induced change blindness (SICB). Usually, the research of John 
Grimes on SICB (e.g. Grimes 1996) is brought forth, and this will be 
the focus of my assessment.
3 The NC interpretation has received philosophical treatment by e.g. Dretske 
(2004) and Tye (2010).
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In SICB the experimenter takes advantage of the fact that during 
saccades the subject is effectively blind. Using eye-tracking to deter-
mine the onset of saccades it is possible to time the switch in visual 
stimulus to occur during saccades. By changing the stimulus during 
saccades the SICB can replicate the experimental effects of other 
CB paradigms. Importantly, the SICB paradigm is supposed to avoid 
the NC interpretation because in this paradigm there is no distrac-
tor screen. If there is no distractor screen, then there cannot be any 
disruption of the pre-change representation preventing comparison 
of the pre- and post-change stimuli. It sometimes is speculated that 
smearing of the visual signal caused by rapid eye movements or brief 
cutoff of visual input during saccades have the same disruptive effect 
as a distractor screen (Simons and Ambinder 2005). Of course, if 
this is the case, the data from SICB will be subject to the NC inter-
pretation and would be ill suited as evidence of misrepresentation. 
Since none of the arguments in this paper depend on this, we can 
concede the proponents of misrepresentation that saccades do not 
disrupt the pre-change state.
For misrepresentation to arise there must be a discrepancy be-
tween the first-order state and the HOT that represents it. In the 
SICB paradigm the content of the HOT is fixed by the state that the 
individual is aware of herself as being in. This means that the content 
is what the individual is conscious of, and the relevant first-order 
state is what the individual actually experiences herself as seeing. 
Rosenthal brings out the discrepancy that would cause misrepresen-
tation by describing the situation as follows: “Because retinal input 
to visual cortex resumes after saccades, first-order states in visual 
cortex presumably did change in ways that reflected the change in 
display, despite participants’ reporting no awareness of such change.” 
(Rosenthal 2012: 8). Here Rosenthal claims that there is reason to 
think the post-change state is represented in the visual system. I agree 
with Rosenthal that there is good reason to believe a new first-order 
state occurs in the early visual system after the saccade. The conclu-
sion Rosenthal draws is that since the subject does not report experi-
encing any change of states, he or she misrepresents the post-change 
first-order visual state. Thus, he claims that there is a discrepancy 
between the occurring HOT and the first-order visual state caused 
by the post-change stimulus. Because subjects do not detect changes 
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in the SICB paradigm, the state that they are aware of themselves as 
being in is the pre-change state. Evidently, the pre-change state does 
not correspond to the post-change state they actually are in.
However, why is it not the case that the subjects are in the states 
they report themselves as being in? Rather than inferring misrepre-
sentation in the case of SICB, one might instead conclude that the 
HOT represents the pre-change state, and does so correctly. This 
conclusion is possible once we allow that the subject may have both 
the pre-change and the post-change states. There is no independent 
reason to think that the pre-change state has disappeared completely. 
Importantly, the pre-change state must exist in some form, although 
possibly not in the early visual system. If the pre-change state did not 
still exist in the system, the subject would not be able to perform 
the comparison of pre- and post-change states and consequently suc-
ceed in the change blindness task. We know that subjects are able to 
perform the change blindness task successfully. That they can do so 
indicates that the pre-change state is present in some form (see e.g. 
Simons and Rensink 2005 for some considerations on this).
This alternative interpretation can explain the data without pos-
iting the occurrence of misrepresentation. The explanation seems 
reasonable from an evolutionary point of view. The external world 
does not usually change on the miniature timescale on which sac-
cades occur. It is unlikely that the visual system faced evolutionary 
pressure to generate a new HOT after every saccade. One might ob-
ject that this consideration is tendentious because the opposite claim 
appears equally probable. The objection would be that it is equally 
probable that the visual system faced great selective pressure to stay 
up to date, and thus the “refresh rate” for HOTs would be very high. 
Yet, while it certainly is likely that there has been selective pres-
sure on the refresh rate for HOTs, this claim is not a viable counter 
argument in the present case. The reason is that on the miniature 
timescale the generation of new HOTs is driven by visual transients 
(i.e. fast changes in luminance or color in the retinal image produced 
by sudden appearance, disappearance, or motion of objects). Most 
change blindness paradigms is set up to mask these transients in dif-
ferent ways. Since we know that retinal input resumes after saccades 
(cf. the quote from Rosenthal 2012 above) it appears that if the re-
fresh rate of HOTs was as high as the objection has it, then change 
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blindness phenomena would not be possible.
On the alternative interpretation I propose, the subject does not 
have a HOT about the post-change state and consequently is in the 
same conscious state he or she was in before the saccade. One might 
protest that this interpretation entails that the HOT represents the 
pre-change state, even though this state no longer exists, viz., that 
the HOT survived the saccade but the pre-change first-order state 
did not. However, this is not the claim I want to make.
I suggest that the pre-change state may survive the saccade, and 
consequently that the HOT (whether a new one or one that was gen-
erated before the saccade) that is about this state can be a correct rep-
resentation of it.4 This is in line with the consideration that both pre- 
and post-change states can exist in the system. Now, because retinal 
input to visual cortex resumes after saccades, one might conclude 
that the pre-change state has been overwritten, and then my claim 
that it may survive would be false. However, to emphasize, I am not 
claiming that the pre-change state necessarily lingers as raw sensory 
information in the early visual areas. It is possible that any informa-
tion in these areas is overwritten once retinal input resumes after 
saccades, as Rosenthal suggests. Nevertheless, there is mounting 
evidence that visual information about previously attended scenes is 
retained in other areas (see e.g. Hollingworth and Henderson 2002). 
In fact, it is reasonable to think that such information is retained in 
memory and plays different roles, say, for learning from perception 
and action as well as the recall of visual scenes in the environment. 
It might also linger in short term memory in the absence of salient or 
competing external input.
Moreover, from a theoretical standpoint, defendants of the HOT 
theory cannot pursue this line of thought because it allows for the 
4 One could object here that the proponents of HOT theory need not be com-
mitted to a new HOT being generated after the saccade. Certainly, some versions 
of HOT theory (e.g. Van Gulick 2004) could pursue this reply. However, on most 
versions of HOT theory (including the one proposed by Rosenthal) a HOT is in-
dividuated at least partly by its content. This means that a HOT cannot change its 
content, so claiming that the pre-change HOT survives and changes its content 
is not an available position. Furthermore, since it introduces no discrepancies 
between the HOT and its content, it is unclear how this position would support 
misrepresentation.
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NC interpretation. The SICB paradigm was initially preferred over 
the flicker paradigms, because it could avoid the NC interpretation. 
On the NC interpretation, there is no discrepancy between the first-
order state and the HOT and thus nothing follows with respect to 
misrepresentation. Thus, from a theoretical standpoint, claiming 
that the pre-change state has disappeared does not salvage the SICB 
data as evidence of misrepresentation.
To summarize, I agree with Rosenthal that because retinal input 
resumes after the saccade, there is reason to believe the post-change 
state exists. My claim is that the pre-change state exists in addition 
to the post-change state. Rosenthal, along with most participants 
in the misrepresentation debate, believe that an individual can have 
unconscious mental states (see e.g. Rosenthal 1997: 731-734, 2000a: 
203, Rosenthal 2004a: 162). This means that on their view, we can 
allow that after the saccade both the pre- and post-change states ex-
ist simultaneously as first-order states, perhaps in different cortical 
areas.
The view that the pre-change state exists does not as such seem 
very controversial. In fact, it appears that defendants of the possibil-
ity of misrepresentation have to endorse this view in order to avoid 
the NC interpretation. Therefore, the interpretation that a HOT 
represents the pre-change state is a viable position.
4 Three possible replies
It is hard to see how the defendants of the possibility of misrepresen-
tation might counter the alternative interpretation of the SICB data. 
To do this, it seems they need to provide evidence of the representa-
tional relations that actually obtain when misrepresentation occurs. 
Remember that misrepresentation means that the HOT either rep-
resents another first-order state than the subject experiences (mild 
misrepresentation) or it does not represent any first-order state at all 
(radical misrepresentation). Of course, in the cases where subjects 
do detect the changes, we can know that they are correctly rep-
resenting the post-change state, and have succeeded in comparing 
it to the pre-change state. However, there appears to be no way of 
determining what representational relationship obtains in the cases 
where changes are not detected. Furthermore, if evidence of the 
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representational relations nevertheless could be produced, it would 
be sufficient to determine if misrepresentation was possible, and the 
SICB data would be superfluous.
Since we have no evidence about the representational relation in 
case of SICB, there is no way to know whether the HOT represents 
the pre-change or the post-change state. Call this the interpretation 
problem. Next, I will consider three possible lines of reply to the in-
terpretation problem that the proponents of misrepresentation might 
pursue. The replies attempt to save SICB as evidence of misrepre-
sentation in three different ways. The first line of reply questions 
whether it is reasonable to say that the HOT is about the pre-change 
state. The second line of reply accepts that there is a problem but at-
tempts to show that, even if the HOT is representing the pre-change 
state, misrepresentation still occurs. The third line of reply objects 
that due to a proviso in the HOT theories, the HOT cannot be al-
lowed to represent the pre-change state in SICB, as I have suggested.
4.1 The first line of reply
The first line of reply denies that the HOT is about the pre-change 
state. If this is true, we can infer that the HOT is about the post-
change state, and misrepresentation follows. The reply can be de-
veloped in two ways; I will argue that neither is successful. The first 
way to develop it is to claim that the HOT in fact cannot be about the 
pre-change state. Conceivably the motivation for this claim would be 
the belief that the pre-change state somehow is degraded or ceases 
to exist. Do we have any reason to believe that the pre-change state 
disappears? There does not seem to be any empirical evidence in 
support of this. On the contrary, if the evidence (cf. Hollingworth 
and Henderson 2002) pertaining to the storage of visual information 
outside of the early visual areas is correct, this is reason to believe 
the pre-state exists. However, a more important consideration is 
the following: If SICB is to count as evidence of misrepresentation, 
there must not be any reason to believe that the pre-change state has 
disappeared. Remember that SICB was favored because the tradi-
tional flicker paradigm was subject to the NC interpretation. The 
NC interpretation explained the experimental effect by positing that 
the pre-change state was disrupted. Because of the disruption, the 
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subjects could not perform the necessary comparison of the visual 
stimuli to detect the changes.
As against the explanation of change blindness by failed compar-
ison, it might be objected that change detection does not require 
comparison. The argument would be that change monitoring is 
sufficient. Suppose a subject is monitoring a green screen in order 
to detect when it changes its colors. It would seem that the subject 
merely needs to represent the current color and register that it disap-
pears to report that the color has changed. Comparison would not 
be necessary. Similarly, once the color has changed, it would seem 
that the subject does not have to represent the pre-change color of 
the screen to report that there was a change. However, the objection 
misses the point. In the traditional change blindness tasks, the sub-
jects are not informed about what aspects of the visual stimuli will 
change. This means that they cannot key their attention to a single 
feature and wait for it to change. Subjects are required to report 
what has changed, and because they are unaware of which object 
or property will change, they have to monitor as many features of 
the display as possible and actively search for a change. In addition, 
to succeed on the task, it is not sufficient to assert that ‘something’ 
has changed or that there was a change. Subjects sometimes report a 
“feeling of change” without being able to pinpoint what has changed 
and in which respect (see e.g. Simons and Rensink 2005). This be-
havior is taken to indicate the presence of implicit change detection. 
To actually know that a change has taken place requires being able to 
describe what the change consisted in5.
The other way to develop the first line of reply is to argue that the 
post-change state constitutes the relevant first-order state. Suppos-
edly, it is the relevant state, because it is the state that actually cor-
responds to the concurrent visual input. On this approach, the ar-
gument is that in SICB, misrepresentation occurs because the HOT 
fails to represent the relevant first order state. As I see it, there are 
two problems with this view. The first problem is that it introduces 
a criterion of relevance into a theory that aims to explain the differ-
ence between conscious and unconscious mental states. The crite-
rion does not receive any independent support, and since it serves 
5 I am thankful to an anonymous referee of this journal for raising this issue.
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no other purpose in the theory than to secure SICB as evidence of 
misrepresentation, it is ad hoc. Furthermore, introducing the notion 
of relevance in this manner consists in a significant modification of 
the HOT theory. A seemingly normative or at least arbitrary crite-
rion would be an uncomfortable amendment to a theory that seeks 
to provide an objective explanation of consciousness.
The second problem for this way of developing the first line of 
reply is that introducing relevance appears to change the notion of 
misrepresentation. It amounts to a bait and switch maneuver in order 
to save the SICB data as evidence of misrepresentation. The notion of 
misrepresentation originally was defined in terms of the discrepancy 
between a HOT and its target state. Suggesting that misrepresenta-
tion occurs when a HOT is not representing the relevant state ap-
pears to introduce a different notion. What exactly such a different 
notion of misrepresentation might consist in is moot, and a separate 
question. What matters here is that this is not the notion of misrep-
resentation that SICB was introduced to support.
4.2 The second line of reply
The second line of reply to the interpretation problem is to argue 
that the conclusion still follows. This line concedes that there is no 
way of knowing whether the HOT represents the pre-change state 
correctly or not. However, SICB nevertheless presents evidence of 
misrepresentation. We may now ask: In what way the HOT misrep-
resents its target in such a case? The answer is that the HOT misrep-
resents the pre-change state in the sense that it represents its content 
(the pre-change visual stimulus) as externally present, when the visual 
stimulus in fact has been replaced by the post-change stimulus. Sup-
posedly, misrepresentation obtains because the HOT describes the 
individual as seeing x, when the individual in fact is seeing y.
It may appear as if the second line of reply preserves the notion 
of misrepresentation as a discrepancy occurring between a HOT and 
the state it is about. But this appearance is misleading. First, the ques-
tion is in virtue of what the previously correctly representing HOT 
suddenly became a misrepresenting HOT? The HOT did not change 
its contents, and neither did the state that it was about. The change 
that turned the correctly representing HOT into a misrepresentation 
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was, it seems, external to the subject. The change was to the visual 
stimuli, not to the visual experience. This means that the misrepre-
sentation occurs because there is a change in how the mental content 
corresponds to the external world. Plainly, the alleged misrepresen-
tation occurs because the state that the individual is conscious of 
herself as being in does not correspond to external reality. Like on 
the first line of reply, this move appears to change the notion of mis-
representation. On the original definition, the discrepancy concerns 
the relation between the subject’s experience and her first-order vi-
sual state.
In addition, notice that the understanding of misrepresentation as 
a discrepancy between (conscious) mental content and the external 
world is uncontroversial. The view that we sometimes may be wrong 
about states of the external world is uncontroversial. I may occasion-
ally see a cow and think it is a horse, but this is inconsequential to 
the notion of misrepresentation that SICB is introduced to support. 
Thus, it appears that the second line of reply fares no better than 
the first line of reply. Both lines of reply save the argument from 
SICB by changing the notion of misrepresentation. While these re-
plies may secure that SICB remains informative about the nature of 
misrepresentation, they do so at the cost of changing the notion of 
misrepresentation that the SICB data originally was intended to be 
evidence of. Crucially, these changes apparently render the notion of 
misrepresentation defended irrelevant to the debate in which SICB 
was supposed to figure as an argument.
4.3 The third line of reply
The third line of reply argues that a proviso of the HOT theories 
prevents the interpretation of the SICB data that has been presented 
here. In original formulations of the HOT theory a mental state is 
conscious when it is accompanied by a HOT (e.g. Rosenthal 1997: 
741). This claim is usually taken as the condition that a HOT must 
be roughly simultaneous with the mental state it is about. Call this 
the simultaneity criterion. The simultaneity criterion is well justified. 
The basic motivation is that it is undesirable that a HOT makes an 
individual conscious of herself as e.g. ‘seeing her grandmother now’, 
when she really was seeing her grandmother yesterday. Our con-
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scious awareness should customarily be about whatever our first-
order states currently represent.
There are two ways of responding to the objection based on si-
multaneity. The first response consists in challenging the simultane-
ity criterion. The second response consists in showing that even if 
the HOT is technically representing a state of the past it nevertheless 
satisfies the simultaneity criterion. I will consider these responses in 
turn.
The first response challenges the scope of the simultaneity crite-
rion in the following way. It seems that there is a tension between 
on the one hand, holding the simultaneity criterion and on the 
other, embracing the possibility of radical misrepresentation. If it 
is allowed that HOTs can occur in the absence of first-order states, 
how is it possible to hold that a HOT must be simultaneous with the 
first-order state it is about? Simultaneity is a two-place relation, and 
therefore depends on the existence of two relata. This problem is 
akin to another issue in the debate on misrepresentation. It has been 
argued (e.g. Block 2011a) that if the HOT theories view conscious 
states as the upshot of a two-place representational relation between 
a HOT and a first-order state, then conscious states cannot occur in 
radical misrepresentation because one of the relata is missing. With 
respect to this issue, the proponents of HOT theory have replied that 
conscious states do not depend on the existence of such a two-place 
relation. A HOT is in itself sufficient to bring about a conscious state 
(Rosenthal 2011). This reply works because a representational rela-
tion may take inexistent objects as one of the relata, as when one 
thinks of the Easter Bunny. However, this kind of reply cannot help 
solve the simultaneity problem, because a thing cannot be simultane-
ous with something that does not exist. The simultaneity criterion 
must be framed as a relation between an existing first-order state 
and a HOT.
Given that the simultaneity criterion has a legitimate role to play 
in the HOT theory, how might it be saved? A straightforward pos-
sibility comes to mind: The simultaneity criterion is only intended to 
hold in the normal case, which means that the possibility of misrepre-
sentation, falling outside of the normal case, is in the clear. However, 
this view precludes the third line of reply, because that line of reply 
presupposes that the simultaneity criterion holds for the SICB data. 
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Arguably, cases of SICB do not count as normal. Thus, if the scope 
of the simultaneity criterion is narrowed to the normal case, appar-
ently, the criterion cannot be used to argue against the interpreta-
tion of CB put forward in this paper, viz., that the HOT is correctly 
representing the pre-change state.
The second response to the reply in terms of simultaneity em-
phasizes that the assumption that the HOT represents a pre-change 
state does not entail that it cannot be simultaneous with the pre-
change state. Empirical research on conscious visual awareness sug-
gests roughly 100 milliseconds (ms) of processing is required, after 
a visual stimulus is presented to the retina, before the subject can 
become consciously aware of it (e.g. Lamme 2003: 15). Since the 
presence of a HOT reveals itself by the occurrence of conscious vi-
sual awareness, this means that it takes at least 100 ms for a HOT to 
be generated. Thus, it seems that a latency of 100 ms between visual 
input and the occurrence of a HOT is the minimum amount of time 
that satisfies the simultaneity criterion. Hence, the lower threshold 
of simultaneity roughly would be 100 ms, because below this thresh-
old no HOT is generated.
The simultaneity criterion was introduced as a proviso against the 
existence of HOTs about first-order states that belong to the past. 
Supposedly, according to the objection from simultaneity, the pre-
change states of the CB paradigm are examples of states that belong 
to the past, because too long a time has passed since they emerged — 
“too long” in comparison to first-order states that have emerged later 
such as the post-change states. The moment that delineates when an 
episode in time starts to count as “too long”, can be conceived of as 
the upper threshold for the simultaneity criterion. This means that 
for simultaneity to hold, the HOT also must occur below certain la-
tency. The exact latency of this upper threshold is an open question, 
but it is reasonable to assume that there is some window to allow for 
individual differences in neural processing. However, any estimate 
of the upper threshold is likely to be arbitrary at this point. The 
window might span very little time, or as much as several hundred 
milliseconds. The exact range is inconsequential for the argument 
here. The important point is that there is some wiggle room in exact 
latency within which simultaneity can be said to obtain. Simultane-
ity thus does not seem entail that the HOT and the first-order state 
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emerge at the same point in time or that they overlap in time.
Now, consider that the timescale on which saccades occur is 
roughly between 5 and 80 ms (Grimes 1996: 90). Consequently, a 
HOT existing after a saccade still will be below the lower threshold 
of the simultaneity criterion because it will be maximally 80 ms re-
moved from the visual input it is about. Furthermore, on the reason-
able assumption that there is a window above the lower threshold, 
within which simultaneity holds, it becomes even more plausible that 
a HOT could represent the pre-change state while still satisfying the 
simultaneity criterion.
To conclude, I have examined three lines of reply against my sug-
gested interpretation of the SICB data. The upshot of this examina-
tion is that none of these lines of reply can sustain SICB as evidence 
of misrepresentation. The first two lines of reply fail to preserve the 
notion of misrepresentation that is at stake in the debate. The third 
line is rejected on the basis of two independent arguments. Thus, the 
interpretation problem remains: Since we do not have any reliable 
evidence about the representational relation in the case of saccade 
induced change blindness, there is no way of knowing whether the 
HOT represents the pre-change or the post-change state. Pending 
further argument or evidence, it seems that whether saccade induced 
change blindness can be counted as evidence of misrepresentation 
remains an open question.6
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